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ABSTRACT: This theoretical note shows that developing countries possess an inherent 
shock-absorbing mechanism that stems from their peculiar institutional characteristics 
that can lessen the gravity of detrimental welfare consequence of exogenous terms-of-
trade disturbances in terms of a two-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model 
with endogenous labour market distortion. The analysis leads to a couple of important 
policies that should be adhered to preserve this in-built system. Finally, it offers an 
important statistically testable hypothesis, empirical validation of which might have an 
important bearing on formulation of development policies in these countries.  
 
 
Keywords: Terms-of-trade shocks, Endogenous labour market imperfection, Shock-
absorbing mechanism, Welfare, Developing countries, General equilibrium. 
 
JEL Classification: D59, D60, F41, F13, F21, J42, J52. 
 
 
2 
 
Do Developing Countries Possess any Built-in Mechanism that Copes  
with External Terms-of-trade Shocks? 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
That developing countries are much more vulnerable to external terms-of-trade (TOT) 
(the price of its exports relative to the price of its imports) shocks relative to countries in 
the northern part of the world has been pointed out by several empirical studies. Such 
fluctuations are undesirable because they contribute to significantly increased volatility in 
the growth of output and hence social welfare. Studies e.g. Baxter and Kouparitsas 
(2006), Broda (2004), Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) have found that TOT 
fluctuations are twice as large in developing countries as in developed nations. Baxter 
and Kouparitsas (2006) have attributed this pattern to the heavy reliance of developing 
countries on commodity exports, whose prices are more volatile vis-à-vis those of 
manufactured goods. They also assert that sharp swings in the TOT affect many of the 
southern economies because they generally have a high degree of openness to foreign 
trade. According to Broda (2004) developing countries are also very exposed to terms-of-
trade fluctuations because they have little influence over their export prices. World 
markets dictate the price of the goods which the developing economies export. On the 
contrary, developed countries and oil exporters can exert a substantial control on export 
prices. So, TOT shifts in developing countries are largely determined by forces outside 
the control of these nations which led Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) to conclude that 
TOT movements can account for most of the output volatility in these countries.  
 
Switching from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and export diversification policies 
have often been advocated to minimize the negative effects resulting from international 
TOT disturbances.1 However, possibly nowhere it has been pointed out that these 
economies have an inbuilt shock-absorbing mechanism that arises due to their peculiar 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Hoffmann (2007), Tornell and Velasco (2000), Broda (2004), Broda and Tille 
(2003), Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) and Haddad et al. (2011). 
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institutional characteristics and hence the necessity for designing development policies so 
as to keep this mechanism unaffected has never been emphasized. In this short theoretical 
note without undermining the efficacy of other suggested measures, we have 
demonstrated by using the simplest and possibly the most widely used Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) trade model for a small open economy with endogenous labour market 
distortion how the existence of labour market imperfection can lessen the gravity of the 
detrimental TOT shocks on welfare of these economies. Furthermore, we have shown 
that policies aimed at deregulating the labour market hurts the effectiveness of the 
inherent shock-absorbing capacity while trade reforms e.g. lowering the tariff rates on 
importables produce the opposite effects. Hence, the developing countries are advised to 
think twice before going for labour market reformatory policies and to enthusiastically 
implement trade reforms and lower their tariff rates on their importables for shielding 
themselves at least to a certain extent from detrimental consequence of exogenous 
volatile price movements in the international market. 
 
Finally, the present analysis suggests an important statistically testable hypothesis. With 
the help of cross-country data it can easily be examined whether the developing nations 
with comparatively unregulated labour market characterized by lesser trade unionism 
and/or lower intersectoral wage differential have been less affected during the last 
worldwide economic recession vis-à-vis some other countries with relatively higher wage 
dispersion and trade union activities. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
We consider the standard HOS model with labour market imperfection in sector 2 for a 
small open economy. In sector 2 (a formal sector) workers receive the endogenously 
determined unionized wage, *W , while their counterparts in sector 1 (an informal sector) 
receive the competitive wage,W . Capital is perfectly mobile between the two sectors and 
its economy-wide return is r . All other standard assumptions of the HOS model are 
retained. Sectors 1 and 2 are the export and import-competing sectors, respectively. 
Commodity prices, iP s are given by the small open economy assumption. Factor 
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endowments are also exogenously given. There is a tariff at the ad-valorem rate, t  on the 
import of commodity 2 so that its domestic price is *2P , where
*
2 2(1 )P t P= + . Finally, 
commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire. 
 
The unionized wage is determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the 
representative firm and the representative labour union in the unionized formal sector 
(sector 2) industry. Assuming homogenous firms and labour unions in sector 2 we here 
directly borrow the simple unionized wage function as derived in details in Chaudhuri 
and Mukhopadyay (2009) which is as follows. 
*
2* *( , , )W W P W U= ; with *
2
* * *( ), ( ), ( ) 0W W W
U W P
∂ ∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂ ∂
    (1) 
In equation (1) the parameter, U denotes the bargaining strength of the labour union in 
each formal sector firm.  
Besides, *( ) 0
*
W WEW W W
∂
= >
∂
;
*
2
2
*( ) 0
*
PWEP P W
∂
= >
∂
; and, *( ) 0
*
W UEU U W
∂
= >
∂
 denote 
the elasticities of *(.)W with respect to *2,W P andU , respectively; and, ( ) 1W PE E+ = .O2 
  
The general equilibrium set-up of the economy is given by the following set of equations. 
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =          (2) 
* *
2 2 2 2 2*( , , ) (1 )L KW P W U a ra t P P+ = + =       (3) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K+ =          (4) 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L+ =          (5) 
where jia  is the amount of the j th factor required to produce one unit of output of 
sector i for ,j L K= ; and, 1,2i = . Here equations (2) and (3) are the two competitive zero-
profit conditions for the two industries while equations (4) and (5) are the two full-
employment conditions for capital and labour, respectively. Determination of factor 
prices and output levels are obvious. 
                                                 
2
 See Chaudhuri and Mukhopadyay (2009) in this context. 
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We assume that sector 1 is more (less) labour-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 
in value sense i.e. 1 2
1 2
*L L
K K
Wa W a
a a
> . As *W W>  it automatically implies that sector 1 is 
more (less) labour-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 in physical sense.  
 
The demand side of the model is represented by the following equations.  
 
Let V  denote social welfare that depends on the consumption of two commodities, 
denoted 1D  and 2D . The strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is depicted by 
1 2( , )V V D D=                   (6) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that 
1 2 2 1 2 2D P D X P X+ = +  (7) 
or equivalently, 
* *
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )D P D X P X tP D X+ = + + −  (7.1) 
                                       
The volume of import of commodity 2, denoted M is given by the following. 
*
2 2 2( , )
              (-)(+)
M D P Y X= −
           (8)         
In equation (8), Y denotes national income at domestic prices and is given by 
*
1 2 2 2Y X P X tP M= + +  (9)                                                                   
In equation (9), 2tP M measures the aggregate tariff revenue of the government which is 
transferred to consumers as lump-sum payments.3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This is the standard assumption made in the theoretical literature on international trade. See 
Marjit and Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009, 2014) among others. 
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3   Consequences of deterioration in TOT  
 
Deterioration in TOT in the existing set-up is captured through an increase in the relative 
international price of commodity 2 i.e. 2P . Now if 2P increases given the rate of tariff, t  its 
relative domestic price (inclusive of tariff), *2P also increases.      
 
Totally, differentiating equations (1) – (5), the following two propositions can easily be 
derived. 
Proposition 1: Deterioration in the TOT leads to (i) a decrease in the competitive 
wage,W ; (ii) an increase in the return to capital, r ; (iii) an ambiguous effect on the 
unionized wage, *W ; (iv) decreases in wage-rental ratios, ( / )W r and ( * / )W r ; (v) an 
expansion (a contraction) of sector 2 (sector 1); and, (vi) an increase in employment of 
labour in sector 2, 2 2 2( )LL a X= .  
 
The consequences onW and r arise due to the Stolper-Samuelson effect while those on 1X  
and 2X occur following the subsequent Rybczynski type effect.4 An increase in *2P produces 
a direct positive effect on *W ( 0PE > ) while the decrease inW produces an induced 
negative effect ( 0WE > ). As it is not possible to understand which of the two effects 
dominates over the other, the net effect on *W is ambiguous. It depends on the 
magnitudes of different technological, institutional, and trade-related parameters. 
However, it can be easily shown that the ( * / )W r ratio surely decreases.5 Consequently, 
producers in sector 2 substitute capital by labour that raises the labour-output ratio in this 
sector, 2La . As sector 2 has expanded, the aggregate employment of labour in this sector, 
2 2 2( )LL a X=  increases.        
 
                                                 
4
 It is needless to point out that a Stolper-Samuelson effect is followed by a Rybczynski type effect 
if technologies of production are of variable-coefficient type. 
5
 Interested readers can easily derive these results. 
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Propositions 2: An exogenous TOT shock raises the intersectoral wage differential, 
( * )W W− . 
  
Intuitions are fairly straightforward. As explained above an increase in *2P  lowers W . On 
the other hand, *W is increasing in both *2P andW . As ( 1)W PE E+ = , even if the net 
effect on *W is negative it would be less severe than that on W due to the presence of the 
additional direct positive effect on the former. Consequently the ( * )W W− gap widens.  
 
Let us now examine the welfare consequence of the TOT shock. Differentiating 
equations (1) – (6), (7.1), (8) and (9) the following expression can be derived.6  
 
2 2
2* * *
1 2 2 2
1( ) ( * )( ) ( ) [ ( )]
1
                          (+)     (+)         (+)             (-)      (+)   
dL dXdV vM
v W W tP v H
V dP dP t dP
= − − + −
+
      (10) 
where: *2 2( / )m P D Y= ∂ ∂  is the marginal propensity to consume commodity 2 (with 
1 0m> > ); [(1 ) /{1 (1 )}] 0v t t m= + + − > ; and, *2 2 2 2[( / ) ( / )] 0H D P D D Y= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ <  is the 
Slutsky’s pure substitution term. We note that 1v > when 0t > because1 0m> > . 
However, when 0t = , 1v = .    
 
From equation (10) the following proposition readily follows. 
Proposition 3: The presence of labour market imperfection can soften the blow of an 
exogenous TOT shock on welfare. 
 
Proposition 3 can intuitively be explained in the following fashion. In the existing set-up 
an exogenous TOT shock can affect social welfare in three ways. First, as the relative 
price of the import good rises, the import-competing sector (sector 2) expands following 
a Rybczynski type effect at the cost of the export sector (sector 1) as the former sector is 
more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the latter. Note that sector 2 is the higher wage-paying 
sector relative to sector 1. The higher (lower) wage-paying sector now absorbs more 
                                                 
6
 Proofs can be available from the author on request. 
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(less) workers than previously. So, the aggregate wage income rises. This we call the 
labour reallocation effect (LRE), which produces a positive effect on welfare. Secondly, 
welfare deteriorates as the economy has now to pay more for importing a certain amount 
of commodity 2 from the international market as its relative price has increased. This 
may be termed as the value of import effect (VIE). Finally, the consumers would 
substitute consumption of commodity 2 by commodity 1 as the relative domestic price of 
the former, *2P has increased. Therefore, the aggregate demand for the import good falls 
but its domestic production has increased. Consequently the volume of import falls. As a 
result, the tariff revenue of the government that the consumers receive as transfer 
payments falls. This also adversely affects welfare. This may be called the tariff revenue 
effect (TRE). The magnitudes of TRE, VIE and TRE are captured by the first, second and 
the third terms of the right-hand-side of equation (10), respectively. Therefore, we find 
that social welfare improves due to positive LRE and worsens due to both negative VIE 
and TRE. So, even if the positive LRE cannot dominate over the combined negative effect 
of VIE and TRE, it indeed neutralizes at least a part of the aggregate detrimental effect of 
the latter two on national welfare. We have already noted that 1v > when 0t > . Hence, 
from equation (10) it follows that the net negative effect of the TOT shock on welfare 
will be magnified.   
 
In the absence of any tariff i.e. at 0t = , the tariff revenue is zero and hence the TRE does 
not exist. In this situation, the LRE would be more effective in nullifying the negative 
effect of the adverse TOT shock on welfare vis-à-vis the case with positive tariff. In (10), 
1v =  when 0t = . So, in the absence of any tariff the net negative consequence on social 
welfare would not be magnified. On the contrary, in the absence of any labour market 
imperfection we have *W W= . Hence, there is no positive LRE. In this situation, the 
adverse consequence of adverse TOT movements at the international markets on national 
welfare would completely be felt by the economy. 
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4. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
 
Some recent empirical studies have found that developing countries are more vulnerable 
to external terms-of-trade shocks compared to developed nations. Policies like switching 
from fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and diversification of the export basket have 
been advocated in general to minimize the negative effects resulting from such 
international disturbances. However, possibly no attempt has been made to identify the 
inherent shock-absorbing mechanism in the developing countries which arises out of their 
typical institutional characteristics. Consequently, the importance of designing 
appropriate development policies for preserving this beneficial conduit has not so far 
been explored. In this short theoretical note, we have demonstrated how the existence of 
labour market imperfection can lessen the gravity of detrimental TOT shocks on social 
welfare of these economies. We have also shown that policies aimed at deregulating the 
labour market hurt the efficacy of the internal shock-absorbing capacity while trade 
reforms e.g. lowering the tariff rate produce the opposite effects. The policy prescriptions 
that readily follow from our analysis are as follows: (i) these countries should think twice 
before going for reformatory policies in the labour market; and, (ii) they should 
vigorously implement trade reforms and lower their tariff rates on importables. 
 
Our analysis also presents an important statistically testable hypothesis. One can examine 
by using cross-country data to verify whether countries with relatively unregulated labour 
market characterized by less trade unionism that are reflected in lesser intersectoral wage 
differential have been less affected during the last worldwide economic recession 
compared to countries with higher wage dispersion and more trade union activities. If this 
hypothesis is found to be statistically significant the purpose of the present analysis will 
be served.         
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